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8.1 The historical evolution of inequality in Latin America 
 
The forces of economic modernisation in the 20th century swept away the pre-modern rural 
outlook of the Latin American economy. All LAC’s witnessed unprecedented rates of 
demographic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation. The increased velocity and impact of 
technological innovation fundamentally altered the structure of production and the 
composition of the labour force. In many advanced industrial countries this modernisation 
process opened up vast opportunities for social mobility and expanding human capabilities. In 
many OECD countries inequality levels are now considerably lower than in the late 19th 
century. Nevertheless, current levels of income inequality in Latin America appear to be 
higher than half a century ago, and perhaps even higher than in the late 19th century. Why did 
modern economic growth not lead to a sustained decline in levels of personal income 
inequality in Latin America?   
 In an attempt to tackle this complicated question three presumptions were made. First, 
it is not the pace of economic growth, but rather the nature of economic development that 
determines whether an economic transition process comes along with major changes in 
inequality the long run. Second, changes in the degree of factor mobility are the prime 
determinant of sustainable changes in the distribution of assets, income and wealth. Third, 
institutional changes are the ultimate cause of changes in the degree of factor mobility.   
Consequently, a comprehensive explanatory framework of long run distributional 
change should include the impact of specifically “Latin American” initial conditions on the 
path dependent process of economic and institutional development. In other words: the 
determinants of economic inequality should be studied in their specific historical context. 
Finally, the interconnections between these determinants, i.e. globalisation, structural change 
(in the broad sense of the word, including demographic and technological change) and 
institutional change, should be studied. Institutional change is taken to be an endogenous 
process. This is the departure point of this study, below follows a summary of its main 
conclusions.  
 
On the basis of secondary literature chapter two discusses the institutionalisation of inequality 
that occurred during the formation of colonial settler societies in Latin America. This 
 198
expression indicates that economic inequality in the colonial era was not just based on a 
system of state granted monopolies and privileges, but was also deeply embedded in day-to-
day practices (and ideologies) of social exclusion and ethnic discrimination. Iberian 
metropolitan institutions were designed to control factor markets, especially the land and 
labour market. High levels of land inequality and various types of coercive labour market 
institutions, such as slavery, serfdom and debt peonage, were legitimised by a colonial order 
promoting the concentration of political power in the hands of various elite factions. The 
loyalty of these elite factions, i.e. the bureaucracy, the clergy and the military, was essential 
for the Spanish crown to control its overseas empire and exploit its mineral riches. The 
institutionalisation of inequality under colonial rule implied that asset inequality was 
pervasive and persistent far into the post-colonial era, but the highly uneven spread and 
impact spread of colonial rule in the region also implied that this legacy differed largely from 
the colonial core areas to the periphery.       
 Chapter three explores the colonial roots of land inequality in Latin America in a 
comparative perspective. A cross-colony regression analysis of land inequality unequivocally 
shows that former Latin American colonies are characterised by extraordinary high levels of 
land inequality. The main question is whether the specific characteristics of Latin American 
natural endowments or the nature of Iberian colonial institutions provide a better explanation 
for the observed persistence and broad diffusion of the phenomenon of land inequality. It is 
argued that the distribution of land was, primarily, a consequence of the policies of the Iberian 
administrations to bind the loyalty of specific local colonial interest groups. This conclusion is 
merited by a cross-colonial comparative case study. The cases of three British colonies, i.e. 
Malaysia, Sierra Leone and Zambia show that colonial policies of land (re)distribution (or 
their absence), are mainly the result of local (Sierra Leone) or international (Zambia) political 
and strategic considerations and, only in second instance, relate to the geographic feasibility 
of a plantation economy (Malaysia). This explains why in a region with such diverse natural 
endowments, land inequality could still become such a widespread phenomenon.   
The legacy of land inequality and the corresponding coercion of large parts of the 
rural population had important implications for the nature of economic development in the 
20th century. Land inequality per se does not necessarily pose a burden to economic 
modernisation. If land inequality would have been induced by some exogenous endowment 
characteristics, these would have lost their economic relevance in the wake of structural 
change. Yet, at the time independent Latin American nation states started to transform into 
urban industrial societies, the large estate owners were still major representatives of the 
political status quo and, as a result, were well able to organise themselves and defend their 
claim on land and labour resources. 
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The call for agrarian reforms has, in many instances, been effectively blocked by a 
landowning elite attempting to retain its traditional economic and political privileges. This 
distributive conflict had (at least) two important long run consequences. It slowed down 
public efforts to strengthen human capabilities, especially via public education, and it 
contributed to the massive migration of the rural poor to the cities in the second half of the 
20th century. In other words, pre-modern land inequality, 20th century educational inequality 
and the expansion of the urban slumps in later decades are intimately related.  
Chapter four starts with the observation that nowhere lese in the world (apart from a 
few Middle East countries) the income differentials between individuals with different levels 
of educational attainment are as high as in Latin America. Educational inequality is, at 
present, the single most important determinant of income differentials in Latin America. 
Chapter four demonstrates that school enrolment rates in Latin America from 1870 onwards 
were considerably lower than could be expected on the basis of average per capita GDP 
levels. And although the expansion of primary school enrolment was not faster or slower than 
could be expected, it is shown that even in comparison to the least developing regions in the 
world, rates of grade repetition and dropping out in primary education were extremely high. 
Because of the development of private schools for the rich, and the biased distribution of 
public resources towards tertiary education, the quality of the schooling programs for the 
masses remained poor. In the last two decades of the 20th century these conditions have 
improved significantly, but they are still lagging far behind the standards of OECD 
economies.   
Historically, the ponderous path of Latin American educational expansion relates to 
the unwillingness of the rich to redistribute part of their wealth to invest in public education 
for the poor. In the context of capital market imperfections, the unequal distribution of 
collateral assets, such as land, severely aggravated educational access barriers. Prevailing 
ideologies justified the idea that education was a privilege of the rich and illustrated the 
mentality of the ruling elites in the 19th and early 20th century. Poverty was held to be a 
result of a lack of innate capacities and the introduction of expensive programs of mass 
education would be a waste of money. Among the poor the stance towards schooling was less 
ideologically inspired, but all the more pragmatic. The forgone rents of sending children to 
school instead of work in fields or factories had to be accounted for in the light of the 
perceived economic gains of schooling. Because of the evident ceilings in the social pyramid, 
the opportunity costs of education easily became prohibitive.  
 
The second part of this thesis starts with a discussion of theoretical and historical perspectives 
on long run distributive change. On the basis of this overview chapter five develops a stylized 
picture of the secular trend of inequality in Latin America’s long twentieth century. The 
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chapter assesses the interconnections the economic forces of globalisation and structural 
change and specific institutional changes. Special attention is being paid to the advent of 
organised labour in the late 19th and early 20th century and the impact of globalisation and 
structural change on the growing political power of the labour movement. It is argued that the 
major turn in socio-economic policy during the interwar years can be viewed as a political 
response to the increasing threat to stability posed by the labour movement. That is to say, 
only in the economically more advanced LAC’s of that time. A second watershed in socio-
economic policy occurred in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This period of political and economic 
turbulence can, ironically, be considered as the result of the definitive failure to accommodate 
the demands of labour, and particularly urban industrial labour. My central hypothesis is that 
these turning points in policy determined the direction of the secular inequality trend in Latin 
America: a tendency of increasing inequality from 1870 until 1913, a tendency of decreasing 
inequality from the 1920’s onwards and, again, a tendency towards increasing inequality from 
the early 1980’s onwards.  
 Chapter six and seven empirically assess this conjecture. Chapter six studies the 
patterns of change in the distribution of factor income during the first phase of the economic 
transition between 1870 and 1940. The analysis yields three empirical results, which in 
combination support the conjecture of a trend break in the period 1919-1929. First, relying on 
the work of Williamson and co-authors (see for instance O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, 
Williamson and Bértola 2006, Williamson 2006), it is shown that the relative rise in real 
unskilled urban wages (relative to land rents and GDP per capita) in the years after the First 
World War, constitute a major trend break in the distribution of factor income compared to 
the period 1870-1913. Second, inter-industry and inter-occupational urban wage gaps as well 
as intra-industry skill-premiums are shown to have been very modest by international 
comparative standards. This is especially the case in the more southern countries, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Third, despite the significantly lower levels of capital-
intensity in industrial production, the distribution of manufacturing income is shown to be 
biased towards the factor capital instead of labour. Altogether these findings suggest that the 
relative rise of the more egalitarian distributed wages in total factor income during the 
interwar years, marked the start of a phase of convergence in the interpersonal distribution of 
income.      
  Chapter seven analyses long run changes in urban wage and productivity differentials 
focusing on the period 1940-2000. The results are linked to a discussion of the ultimate causes 
of the “recent rise” in income inequality. Hence, this chapter brings together various aspects 
of the historical process discussed in preceding chapters. The bottom line of the 
argumentation is that the current institutional system was insufficiently prepared for the 
dramatic transition in relative labour endowments. The fundamental changes in the 
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composition of the labour force, especially the great rise of the urban informal sector, were 
the result of institutional barriers that were rooted in the colonial past. 
The expansion of the urban informal sector in the last quarter of the 20th century was 
a result of unprecedented demographic pressure and an uncontrolled flow of rural migrants to 
the city. The incidence of rural-urban migration in Latin America was much higher than, for 
instance, in the newly industrialising economies in East Asia. This phenomenon can only be 
understood when taking into account the ISI policies favouring urban labourers at the expense 
of rural labourers. And perhaps even more important is the historical legacy of pervasive land 
inequality as discussed in chapter three. Colonial institutions had been designed to cope, first 
and for all, with the problem of chronic labour scarcity. Yet, these institutions formed a very 
poor foundation to absorb the rapidly growing surplus of urban labour. The conditions to 
make optimal use of the talents of unskilled labourers were simply absent (see chapter four).  
 An investigation of the trends in inter-industry manufacturing wage and productivity 
differentials reveals the consequences of a lack of institutional reforms. First, inter-industry 
wage differentials were much higher at the end than at the beginning of the 20th century (as 
presented in chapter six). Second, increasing wage and productivity differentials appear to be 
correlated in the last quarter of the 20th century. Third, the increasing trend of manufacturing 
wage and productivity differentials clearly outpaced the increasing trend observed in the three 
other NWC’s (Australia, Canada and the USA). Most of the studies analysing the recent trend 
of income distribution in OECD countries and LAC’s (1970-2000) find that skill-biased 
technological change is the ultimate cause of increasing wage differentials. Skill-biased 
technological change has probably, but not necessarily, been enhanced by increasing global 
competition in labour intensive commodities. Yet, the question remains why the increase in 
inter-industry wage and productivity differentials was so much sharper than elsewhere?     
 My answer is twofold. First, the poor quality and unequal distribution of education 
severely restricted the mobility of the Latin American labour force in terms of 
entrepreneurship and human capital acquisition. Skill-biased technological change and the 
increasing surplus of unskilled labour kept wages in low productive sectors under pressure, 
while the wages of the better educated and skilled labourers increased. The redistributive 
income polices that were pursued in many LAC’s around the mid-20th century were 
insufficiently complemented by institutional reforms to remove factor market imperfections. 
Although this part of the answer accounts for the recent rise in inequality in Latin America 
from a historical perspective, it does not exactly clarify why urban wage gaps increased when 
they did.          
 The timing of the rise in urban wage inequality corresponded with important changes 
in labour market policies. Where factor market institutions were designed to protect the 
wealth of the land owning elites in the 19th century, they were designed to protect the 
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development and stability of the urban sector, and in particular the urban industrial sector, in 
the middle of the 20th century. Wage regulations played an important role in industrial 
development policies and formed an indispensable part of the political agenda of left wing 
parties and labour unions. The examples of Peronism in Argentina and the presidencies of 
Frei and Allende in Chile illustrate that the impact of wage regulation programs on the level 
of wage inequality was huge: before the implementation of neo-liberal reforms in the late 20th 
century, urban wages gaps were in many LAC’s artificially compressed. Yet, these wage 
regulation programs often excluded the poorest segments of the population, i.e. the rural poor 
and the urban informal sector workers. Hence, with the growth of the latter group, the 
structure of urban income and production revealed a tendency towards polarisation. But the 
main point is that, in the long run, wage regulation schemes can only be sustained if economic 
competition is also regulated.        
  Changes in labour market institutions became inevitable when the financial and fiscal 
burden of populist and socialist models of industrial development grew to unmanageable 
proportions. In some LAC’s these development models were abruptly ended by a political or 
military coup. In other countries reforms were provoked by the debt crises that struck the 
entire region in the early 1980’s. Wages were readjusted to levels in accordance with free 
markets. That is to say: especially the wages in private sectors operating in a competitive 
global environment, but not in those industries which retained monopolistic advantages. 
Especially in highly capital intensive industries there appeared to be sufficient leverage to 
raise the wages of its employees. In this regard the neo-liberal reforms can be said to have 




8.2 Future perspectives  
 
The unfolded argumentation may seem to contain some traces of historical determinism. This 
study, however, does not suggest that the recent rise of inequality in Latin America was 
inevitable. Neither is the prospect of persistent inequality in the future. This study points out 
that the institutional reforms necessary to distribute the fruits of increased economic welfare 
in a more egalitarian way, first and fro all, require a solid solution to the endemic distributive 
conflicts which are the ultimate cause of institutional rigidities. This study further points out 
that some specific socio-economic policies, such as the ISI policies of the mid-20th century, 
have had unintended, but undesirable, long run consequences. Taking stock of the past can 
help to avoid policy mistakes in the future. And there are reasons to be optimistic. When 
making up the balance, it is clear that the conditions of inequality at the start of the 21st 
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century differ fundamentally from those around 1870. Some areas of progress are especially 
worth mentioning.      
Modern economic growth is driven by the capitalisation of highly specific 
technologies, knowledge and skills. Sustained rates of productivity growth are the key to the 
reduction of inequality and poverty in the long run. Investments in the accessibility and 
quality of education form an absolute prerequisite. Such an investment effort requires 
endurance, a deeply experienced sense of urgency and a broad consensus on the necessity and 
usefulness of resource reallocation towards public education. Although it is virtually 
impossible, at any point in time, to judge whether progress will be sustainable, public 
investments in education have been rapidly increasing in the last decades and educational 
completion rates have rapidly improved. To see whether these steps forward have 
corresponded with improvements in the quality of education internationally comparable data 
on students test results have to be awaited 
  A related area of progress relates to the reduction of factor market imperfections. 
Procedures to acquire formal recognition of ownership rights are still fraught with 
bureaucratic red tape. Corruption and social discrimination prohibit access to legal services to 
large groups of people and also contribute to the weaknesses in property rights protection in 
general. These institutional failures do not only result in a suboptimal investors’ climate, they 
also lead to a waste of energy, talents and human motivation. These barriers press hardest on 
the people that do not dispose of collateral assets and have no access to social or political 
networks to express their concerns. Yet, capital market constraints are actively countered, for 
instance by the widespread introduction of micro-credit programs. These programs facilitate 
capital mobility and expand business opportunities, especially in the informal sector. On the 
other hand, the success of these micro-credit programs also has a downside, as they tend to 
withhold the involvement of domestic commercial banks in the informal sector.   
 Active support for the poor in the form of immediate transfers, social security 
programs or public goods requires complementary policies to mend the incentive structure in 
such a way that such policies do not create an everlasting dependency. The basic principle of 
pro-poor aid should be that it becomes redundant in the near future. The adoption and design 
of such policies demands a capable, interested, responsible and decisive administration. 
Although virtually all LAC’s are at present administered by a democratically elected 
government, good governance still is one of the major bottlenecks to the implementation of 
sustainable strategies of poverty relief and inequality reduction. But also in this area there are 
some promising signals of improvement. 
The outspoken tendency in some LAC’s towards increasing openness and 
transparency in policy making and administrative procedures may spill-over to neighbouring 
countries. For instance, the impressive recent political and economic development of Chile, 
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sets an example for the region and can induce a virtuous cycle of institutional competition 
across countries in the region. Latin America has clearly embarked upon a path of economic 
integration. When intra-regional transaction costs will be further reduced and the 
opportunities of intra-regional economic integration will be further exploited, the chances for 
economic specialisation, diversification and mutual learning will increase. Yet, the political 
actuality also gives reason to fear that some LAC’s will repeat the mistakes of the past. 
Increasing terms of trade of mineral resources such as oil and gas, reduce the incentives to 
diversify the economy and strengthen its foundation for future generations. Solving endemic 
distributive conflicts by abandoning fiscal discipline is not a solid strategy to reduce poverty 
and inequality in the long run.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
